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Abstract 
This thesis examines the problem of failed and failing states set against the 
'theory' that has accompanied this discourse. It uses a case study of Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) to examine both the theory and its related application in the Failed 
States Index (FSI) developed by the Fund for Peace and the Foreign Policy 
magazme. 
Critically examining the methodology used in the FSI, the thesis analysis a wide 
range of information about the social, economic and political problems facing 
PNG to highlight shortcomings in the current construction of the Index. These 
shortcomings are then used to highlight conceptual problems in the construction 
of categories in failed state 'theory': weak, failing failed. Whereas PNG has been 
designated a weak state, the thesis argues that this categorisation is ambiguous 
and, possibly, inaccurate. 
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Introduction 
Located on Australia's doorstep, the island nation of Papua New Guinea (PNG) is 
at a crossroads. Praised for remaining among the community of democratic 
nations, it faces a range of challenges that threaten its stability. Many of these 
challenges are the products of a truly unique country with deep, ongoing traditions 
being transformed into a modem nation. As stated by Fullerton (2006, p. 515) 
"Papua New Guinea is a different place, a place where highly evolved societies 
have been dragged into economic modernity by colonial powers and then by the 
expectations of the development community". 
PNG is a nation made up from a large number of islands with the main land mass 
being the eastern half of the island of New Guinea 1• It is a former colony of 
Australia and it has since its independence in 1975 remained a democratic 
country, but one where traditional customs have survived (AusAID, 2006, p. 53). 
The population ofPNG has in 2006 reached 5.6 million with a continuously rapid 
increase rate of around 2.5 percent each year (May, 2006, p. 152; Samana, 1988, 
p. 61; The World Fact Book, 2006, online). Eighty-five percent of the population 
live in rural areas where the traditional forms of social organisation into tribes, 
clans and their sub-groups are still dominant. In these areas local tribe and clan 
leaders hold the authority, and the influence ofthe state is weak (AusAID, 2000, 
p. 20; May, 2006, p. 152). 
1 See map on p. xi. 
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PNG is one of the world's most fragmented societies and although there is no 
exact figure on how many ethnic groups exist, Reilly argues that "informed 
observers" have estimated the number to be in the region of 5,000 to 7,000 
separate groups, often referred to as 'tribes' or 'clans' (Reilly, 2000, p. 175). 
There are over 800 different languages and thousands of dialects spoken in PNG 
(Samana, 1988, pp. 61-62) and, due to dramatic geographical terrain made up 
from mountain ranges and deep valleys, many clans have traditionally lived rather 
isolated from other clans with inter-clan warfare being the primary point of 
contact2 (May, 2006, p. 152; Reilly, 2000, p.175. A high level of social 
fragmentation and ethnic diversity has often been linked to democratic instability 
by political scholars and policy makers (Reilly, 2000, pp. 162-163). In PNG, 
however, the high level of social fragmentation has had both a positive and a 
negative impact on the nation's political stability. 
PNG was colonised in 1884 by Germany and Great Britain3. Australia took over 
the administration ofthe British part in 1906 and the German part in 19144 and 
the Australian colony was established. PNG gained its independence from 
Australia on the 161h of September 197 5 and thereby its new constitution came 
into effect, through which PNG adopted a Westminster-style parliamentary 
system. This constitution was a product of extensive research undertaken by the 
Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC), which had been established by Sir 
Michael Somare in 1972 after he had become the Chief Minister of the PNG 
2 According to Lemonnier (1991, pp. 8-9), this type of warfare in PNG has not traditionally been 
oriented towards total conquest and extermination but can be regarded as a milder form of 
competitive activity. 
3 PNG was split with Germany colonising the nmihem half and Great Britain colonising the 
southern part (Wanek, .1996, p. 29). 
4 Australia conquered the German part ofPNG in 1914 and it was formally given to Australia as a 
Trust Area by the League of Nations after WWI (Wanek, 1996, p. 35). 
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House of Assembli. The CPC was created to ensure that the constitution that 
would be adopted by the independent PNG would be as true to Papua New 
Guinean ideals and values as possible. In the words of Somare : "I urged the 
establishment of the CPC because I wanted to ensure that independence, when it 
finally came, would be true independence, approved by our own people and 
reflected in a constitution of our own making" (Somare, 2001, p. 16). As a result, 
a variety of political parties were founded with their main differences being the 
geography and culture of their origins (Moore, 2003, p. 197). 
It has been argued that the very nature of its fragmented society has provided 
PNG with a political climate where democracy can prevail; its society is simply 
too fragmented to produce any one group that is strong enough to dominate or 
challenge the political system on a nationallevel6 (Reilly, 2000, p. 167). The 
elected members of the PNG Parliament reflect the large number of separate 
ethnic groups in the country and this has contributed to every government to date 
being a coalition. No group is strong enough to take over power in a way that 
would be unconstitutional and PNG can therefore be regarded as a successfully 
functioning democracy. On the other hand, because of the social fragmentation, 
factors usually associated with democratic systems have posed severe threats to 
PNG's political stability; notably the problems of the weak party system and the 
first-past-the-post electoral system, both of which has ensured a continuing trend 
ofweak coalition governments. 
5 The House of Assembly was the forerunner to the PNG parliament. Its members were elected by 
the people ofPNG, but had no real national power under the Australian rule pre-independence. 
6 Reilly uses a study ofl>NG to argue that social fragmentation is not a factor that will always 
undermine democracy, but that it can work in the exact opposite way. 
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PNG then is a 'different' country facing some obvious political, economic and 
social challenges. It is currently classified as a 'weak' state by some expe1is, with 
others discussing the real threat ofPNG failing as a state7 (Denoon, 2005, pp. 
178-179). For this to have any meaning, there needs to be an agreement on what is 
meant when referring to a state as 'weak', 'failing' or 'failed'. The discourse on 
state failure has been around for some time, evolving over time as the ever-
changing international political climate has produced new scenarios of states 
failing. In recent years, this discourse has been given increased attention. 
This honours thesis will examine the problem of failed and failing states; the 
'theory' that has developed over recent years and its practical application to PNG. 
The 'theory' is relatively new and it has the potential to play a large part in 
international politics. In 2005, the current affairs magazine Foreign Policy 
together with the Fund for Peace, a research and educational organisation that 
works to prevent war, produced the Failed States Index (FSI) based on the ideas 
of failed state theory. The Index assesses countries, using a set of indicators and 
rates them accordingly to determine whether or not they are failed states. This 
thesis will explore the applicability and usefulness of this index by analysing its 
assessment ofPNG. 
The main problem to be examined in the thesis is: 
);;> How failed state theory is represented in the FSI and to what extent 
the Index is relevant to PNG. 
7 See Denoon, 2005, pp·. 178-179 for a discussion on several experts' opinions on PNG's status as 
a weak or failing state. 
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This problem will be approached through a set of four research questions: 
1) What is failed state theory and how is it incorporated in the PSI? 
2) What is the fudex methodology in assessing a specific country? 
3) What are some of the key shortcomings ofthe Index and how are 
these apparent in the Index's assessment of PNG- political, 
economic and social issues? 
4) How does a case study ofPNG contribute to an evaluation of the 
usefulness of the fudex? 
The problem of failed and weak states is a global issue that requires global 
attention. As it would be much more expensive to restore an already failed state 
than it would be to 'save' a weak state, it is important to understand the nature of 
state failure and detect the signs of a weak state in danger of failing (Straw, 2006, 
online). 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001· changed the way in which the western 
world regarded the problem of failed states (Dunlap, 2004, online; Patrick, 2006a, 
p. 27). Failed and weak states have now become a key issue in international 
security politics as they are widely perceived as being perfect hosts for terrorists 
and other forms of organised crime (Krasner & Pascual, 2005, p. 153; Mallaby, 
2002, online). They are also horne to a majority of all violent conflicts, producing 
millions of people living in extremely poor conditions and contributing to a global 
humanitarian problem (The African Studies Centre et al, 2003, online). 
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The PSI has the potential to be a useful tool in analysing state failure and 
identifying countries that are at risk of failing. As the Index is relatively new, 
having been founded only last year, its effectiveness has yet to be proven. Its 
assessments of different countries need to be analysed in order to provide 
conclusions on the usefulness of the Index and this thesis is aimed at reaching 
some of these conclusions by analysing the PSI's application to PNG. 
PNG is geographically Australia's closest neighbour and its stability, or lack 
thereof, is important to Australia and the South Pacific region. At the moment, 
PNG is not recognised as a failed state, with the PSI identifying PNG as a weak 
state (Failed States Index, 2006c, online). However, it seems to share several of 
the symptoms connected with failed state theory and therefore PNG's status needs 
to be further analysed. 
Australia is PNG's largest aid donor, contributing around $300 million in aid each 
year (Morris and Stewart, 2005, online). The aid effort needs to be effective if 
PNG is to avoid remaining a weak state or, worse, slide into state failure. 
According to Hawksley (2006, p. 161), the Australian govermnent fears that the 
state ofPNG may collapse. Therefore, it is crucial for Australia to fully 
understand the nature and implications of failed state theory as it applies to PNG. 
The primary aim of this thesis is to provide a discussion on failed state theory and 
an assessment of the usefulness of the PSI. Due to the limitations of an honours 
thesis, the case study ofPNG does not aim to provide a full assessment of the 
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country but rather it uses some key issues in PNG to evaluate the PSI. All 
conclusions will therefore be primarily related to the failed state theory and the 
Index, and only secondary to PNG8. 
The resources used for this thesis can be divided into three groups: those 
concerning failed states, those concerning PNG, and resources directly provided 
by the PSI. The aim has been to merge the information from primary sources with 
that of secondary sources to provide an original analysis of failed state theory, the 
Index and its application to PNG. 
The first two groups of resources include books, journal articles, government 
reports and reports from international organisations such as the UN and the IMP. 
The second group also includes articles from the PNG newspaper The Post 
Courier. Some notable authors are Robert I. Rotberg, expert on state failure, and 
Sinclair Dinnen, Ron J. May and Ben Reilly, experts on various aspects ofPNG. 
The third group consists of material made available online by the PSI. This may 
have been published either on the Foreign Policy or the Fund for Peace website. 
As both websites contain frequent cross-referencing to each other as well as 
copies ofthe same material, all information from these websites will be in-text 
referenced as 'Failed States Index' with the appropriate web addresses provided in 
the end-text bibliography. The information on the PSI, its methodology and its 
assessment ofPNG, has been limited to what is currently published on the 
8 There are several other issues in PNG that would have to be considered for a complete analysis 
of the country, such as impacts of colonialism, gender inequalities, involvement of TNCs in 
natural resources industries like mining and timber, and problems related to the under-funding of 
the police force and the PNGDF. 
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Foreign Policy or the Fund for Peace websites as there are yet to emerge 
secondary sources that critically examine the Index. 
As a sound understanding ofPNG history and culture was required for this thesis, 
a number of anthropology as well as history texts have been consulted. As 
specified by Yin (2003, pp. 59-61) researchers need to have a firm grasp of the 
issues being studied to be able to correctly collect and analyse relevant data (Yin, 
2003, pp. 59-61, 111-112). Therefore, anthropology texts have been used for the 
understanding ofthe unique cultures in PNG, the concept of big men and the 
distribution of social and political authority, as traditional ways are highly 
relevant to current political, economic and social issues. Extended readings also 
included history texts to further the understanding of how the cultures in PNG 
were developed, the influence ofwestem systems through the years of 
colonisation, and the merger of these influences with traditional ways in the 
attempt to create the modem, independent state ofPNG. However, the focus is 
necessarily on how these concepts explain the political dynamics ofPNG. 
This thesis is presented in accordance with a linear-analytic structure which is a 
standard approach for composing research projects and is recommended for theses 
(Yin, 2003, pp. 152-153). This thesis is divided into this introduction, five 
chapters, and a conclusion. The first chapter provides an examination of failed 
state theory and how it is incorporated in the PSI together with the methodology 
of the Index. This then provides the tool for the case study ofPNG9, starting with 
an analysis in chapter two of how PNG received its rating by the Index. This 
9 This is in accordance to the guidelines for research using a theory and a case study as presented 
by Yin (2003, pp. 28, 32-33, 111-112). 
8 
analysis will bring to light any potential deficiencies and I or inaccuracies of the 
Index. These will then be further examined by discussing some ofPNG's specific 
political, economic and social issues in chapters three, four and five, with findings 
and recommendations presented in the conclusion. 
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Chapter 1 - Failed State Theory and the Failed States Index 
Failed state theory, like any theory in the social sciences, attempts to explain 
reality. A theory is a "set of systematically related propositions", which functions 
primarily to use facts in order to explain a phenomena and I or the relationship 
between different phenomenon or concepts (Biesanz & Biesanz, 1973, p. 35). 
According to Blumer (cited in Biesanz & Biesanz, 1973, p. 35), the aim of a 
theory is "not to form scientific propositions but to outline and define life 
situations so that people may have a clearer understanding of their world, its 
possibilities of development, and the directions along which it may move". An 
effective theory should allow a framework for interpreting data as well as purpose 
and directions for research. Furthermore, it should be useful in identifying 
similarities between different things, as well as differences between similar things 
(Biesanz & Biesanz, 1973, p. 36). 
It follows that a theory needs to be broad enough to be applicable to different facts 
and concepts at the same time as it needs to be specific enough to have sufficient 
explanatory power to be useful. A failed state theory should therefore identify 
what constitutes failure and explain the phenomena of state failure by exploring a 
range of data and identifying similarities and differences from cases of failing 
states to show why and how they failed. 
State failure can be defined as "the demise of the practical operation of 
governmental functions for a particular territory of an internationally recognized 
state" (Wallensteen, 1998, online). This can be manifested in several different 
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ways, for example through the government's inability to control its borders and 
territory and provide basic services to its citizens. States have failed ever since the 
creation of the nation-state in the 1 ih century, and post World War II the process 
of de-colonisation and the end of the Cold War has seen a number of new states, 
mainly in Africa and Asia, struggling to develop into well-functioning, stable 
entities (Helman & Ratner, 1992, p. 3; Thiirer, 1999, online). 
As a consequence, failed and failing states have become a topic for international 
academic discourse. However there is still to emerge a general definition as to 
what exactly constitutes a failed state and the causes behind state failure (Baker 
cited in Fowler, 2006, online). This discourse has been loosely referred to as a 
'theory' (Khor, cited in Lambach, 2006, p. 410). However, most experts discuss 
failed states as a broad concept or phenomenon (Dunlap, 2004, online; Helman & 
Ratner, 1992; Rotberg, 2003; Thiirer, 1999). Since President Bush declared the 
'war on terror', the attention given to failed states shifted from being concerned 
with humanitarian issues to international security issues (Dunlap, 2004, online; 
Patrick, 2006a, p. 27), and, as a result, it has received increased attention. 
Failed states emerged as one of the most important issues in international politics 
after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. The 
presence of failed states as a significant issue on the political agenda was 
confirmed by the American President George W. Bush who claimed in the 
National Security Strategy for 2002 that the US was now threatened more by 
failing states than by conquering ones (Bush, 2002, online). Bush's sentiment was 
echoed by the British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (2002, online) who stated that 
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"turning a blind eye to the breakdown of order in any part of the world, however 
distant, invites direct threats·to our national security wellbeing ... preventing states 
from failing and resuscitating those that fail is one of the strategic imperatives of 
our times". 
The importance of addressing the issue of failed and failing states has been further 
stressed by several scholars, with Robert I. Rotberg (2003, p. 1) arguing that 
nation-states are what constitute the foundation of legitimate world order and that 
failing and failed states threaten this very system. Jeffrey Record (2000, online) 
claims that failed states have become the "primary source of instability in the 
international political system". Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual (2005, 
p.153) agree, stating that weak and failed states acutely threaten global security 
due to the world's increasing level of interconnectedness. This threat is identified 
as taking the form of terrorism, illegal drug trade, weapon proliferation, 
trafficking of illegal workers and other forms of organised crime (Krasner & 
Pascual, 2005, p. 153; Mallaby, 2002, online). 
However, failed and failing states should not only be regarded as an important 
issue because they pose a threat to global security; indeed they also produce 
horrific consequences for their own citizens. A report prepared by The African 
Studies Centre in Leiden, the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam, The Center of 
Social Studies at Coimbra University and The Peace Research Center- CIP-
FUHEM in Madrid states that a majority of the world's armed conflicts occur in 
failing or collapsed states, and that they create situations where millions of people 
are affected by death and social and economic destruction which further create a 
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massive number of refugees and internally displaced people (The African Studies 
Centre et al, 2003, online). · 
In spite ofthe increased attention being given to the issue of failed and failing 
states, the topic of state failure is still under-researched (Rotberg, 2003, p. 2). 
Therefore, there is yet to emerge a definitive and globally acknowledged 
definition of what constitutes a failed or failing state and the 'theory' is still 
developing. Daniel Thiirer (1999, p.732) argues that the term "failed", when 
describing a state, serves as a "broad label of a phenomena" rather than denoting a 
specific and clearly defined situation. There is still uncertainty about how to 
define a failed or failing state and how widespread the problem is (The Failed 
States Index, 2005b, online). 
When attempting to define state failure, there needs to be an agreement on what 
constitutes the functions of a state. According to Rotberg (2003, p. 2) "Nation-
states exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public) 
goods to persons living within designated parameters (borders)". It follows that 
the success or failure of a state is directly dependent upon its ability to deliver 
these political goods to its people, as agreed by Patrick (2006a, p. 29), and that by 
studying the effectiveness of the state in this task, the observer can determine 
whether the state is strong, weak, failed or collapsed (Rotberg, 2003, p. 2). 
Rotberg argues that there exists a hierarchy of political goods (2003, p. 3). At the 
top of this hierarchy is human security and according to political theory, the state 
is irreplaceable in guaranteeing this security (Lambach, 2006, p. 208). Therefore, 
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the most important function of the state is to provide a secure environment in 
which its citizens can live. For the state to be successful in this, it needs to protect 
its sovereignty from outside intervention, ensure a secure domestic climate free 
from attacks on the state's social structure and the national order, to prevent 
crime, and to allow for its citizens to settle their disputes, whether it be with the 
state or with fellow citizens, in a peaceful way (Rotberg, 2003, p. 3). 
The next political good on the hierarchy is the opportunity for the citizens to 
actively play a part in the political process ofthe state (Rotberg, 2003, p.3). This 
political good can be referred to as the legitimacy ofthe state (Patrick, 2006a, p. 
29). It includes the right to compete for political office, respect and support for 
political institutions both on a national and regional level, as well as the provision 
of civil and human rights (Rotberg, 2003, p. 3). Therefore, democracy is a 
necessity if not always a guarantee of a strong and successful state. 
Further down the hierarchy of political goods can be found healthcare, the 
provision of education, physical and communicational infrastructure, and a 
beneficial fiscal climate (including a money and banking system) in which the 
citizens can pursue their economic interests (Patrick, 2006a, p. 29; Rotberg, 2003, 
p.3-4). Furthermore, the state is also expected to supply methods of controlling 
the sharing of environmental commons and to promote its civil society (Rotberg, 
p. 4). Ifthese political goods are considered, roughly ranked in above mentioned 
order, they provide a set of criteria by which the nature of a state can be 
determined as being strong, weak, failed or collapsed (Rotberg, p. 4). 
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Experts have also identified some key indicators, as opposed to criteria, of state 
failure. These include widespread corruption, increased criminality and violence 
(The African Studies Centre et al., 2003, p. 4), and declining real national and per 
capita levels ofthe state's annual gross domestic product (GDP) (Rotberg, 2003, 
pp. 6-8). If added to the set of criteria discussed above, these indicators can 
provide useful information about the health of a nation and contribute to the 
detection of a failing state. 
In addition, Rotberg (2003, p. 9) explains how a nation-state can lose its 
legitimacy. Once a state loses the capacity to provide its citizens with the expected 
political goods, and if the small capacity the state retains is devoted to furthering 
the interests of the ruling elite (or alternatively the ruling ethnic group), the 
excluded citizens will not remain loyal to the state (Rotberg, 2003, p. 9). This can 
lead to a situation where people transfer there allegiances and loyalty to the local 
community and traditional cultural leaders become more powerful and influential 
than state leaders (Rotberg, 2003, p. 9). 
This situation is particularly important when analysing PNG as it has such high 
levels of social fragmentation and allegiances to traditional leaders, such as a 
clan's 'Big Men' 10, have remained strong. It would therefore seem that it is 
especially important for the government in a country with this type of political 
culture to have strong presence throughout its territory, and to make every effort 
possible to ensure its population that it is devoted to furthering the interests of the 
nation rather than those of individual politicians or small, specific groups. 
10 See further discussion on big men in chapter 2. 
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When discussing state failure, experts have introduced terms such as 'weak' and 
'failing' states, referring to states that may share some ofthe characteristics of 
failed states, but which are still functioning to various degrees. Furthermore, the 
expression of 'collapsed state' has been used to describe a state that has gone 
beyond being failed to such a degree that there is no recognisable government left 
(The African Studies Centre et al., 2003, p. 2). Therefore it can be argued that 
there is a continuum of state failure, moving from weak through failing and failed 
to collapsed. 
Although failed states are far from a new phenomenon in global politics, the 
'theory' on failed states is relatively new and there is yet to emerge a definitive 
agreement on its definitions and key criteria. Indeed, most experts do not refer to 
the discussion on failed states as a theory but treat it as a broad, and currently 
under-researched, concept (Rotberg, 2003, pp. 2-3). This poses the question of 
whether failed state theory is specific enough to be useful when analysing the 
functioning of a country. On the other hand; is the 'theory' broad enough to be 
applicable to any given country? Does it have the flexibility to take unique 
circumstances into consideration? 
One recent attempt to use the ideas of failed state theory to provide specific 
country assessments has been the FSI. Foreign Policy together with the Fund for 
Peace developed this index in 2005, which had as its primary objective to 
"present a more precise picture ofthe scope and the implications" ofthe problems 
posed by failed and failing states (Failed States Index, 2005b, online). According 
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to the Fund for Peace, the definition they use for a failing state is a state where the 
government "is losing physical control of its territory or lacks a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force" (Failed States Index, 2005b, online). The Index provides a 
global ranking of weak and failed states that are being updated on an annual basis. 
It uses 12 specific indicators grouped along social, political and economic lines, 
and by analysing an extensive amount of key data related to these 12 indicators 
the rankings ofthe Index has been reached. The indicators are 11 : 
Social indicators: 
Mounting demographic pressure- Pressures deriving from high population 
density, group settlement patterns and skewed population distributions. 
Massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons creating complex 
humanitarian emergencies Forced uprooting of large communities as a result of 
random or targeted violence and/or repression. 
A legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia -History of 
aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, specific groups 
singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or 
repression and institutionalised political exclusion. 
Chronic and sustained human flight- 'Brain drain' of professionals, intellectuals 
and political dissidents fearing persecution or repression, the voluntary emigration 
11 These are summaries of the indicators' definitions. See Appendix B for the complete definitions. 
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of the middle class, such as entrepreneurs, business people, artisans and traders, 
due to economic deterioration and the growth of exile communities. 
Economic indicators: 
Uneven economic development along group lines- Group-based inequality, or 
perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and economic status. 
Sharp and I or severe economic decline- A pattern of progressive economic 
decline ofthe society as a whole as measured by per capita income, GNP, debt, 
child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures, and other economic 
measures. 
Political indicators: 
Criminalisation and I or delegitimisation of the state- Massive and endemic 
corruption or profiteering by ruling elites and widespread loss of popular 
confidence in state institutions and processes. 
Progressive deterioration of public services- Disappearance ofbasic state 
functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism 
and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, 
sanitation and public transportation. 
The suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread 
violation of human rights - Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule 
in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended 
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or manipulated, outbreak of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence 
against innocent civilians and widespread abuse of legal, political and social 
rights. 
Security apparatus operates as a 'state within a state' Emergence of elite or 
praetorian guards that operate with impunity and emergence of an 'army within 
an army' that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique. 
The rise of factionalised elites -Fragmentation of ruling elites and state 
institutions along group lines. 
Intervention of other states or external political actors Military or Para-military 
engagement in the internal affairs of the state by outside armies, states, identity 
groups or entities and intervention by donors, especially ifthere is a tendency 
towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions (Failed States 
Index, 2006h, online). 
When analysing a country, these 12 indicators are each given a number on a scale 
from 0-10, 10 being the worst, to produce a total for any assessed country. This 
total then places the country on a list, the Index, where the country with the 
highest total is the country assessed to be the 'most failed'. The 12 indicators are 
currently equally weighted, meaning that the Index does not have the ability to 
consider whether some indicators are of higher importance than others in a certain 
country. According to the President of the Fund for Peace, Pauline Baker, the 
reason why the indicators are of equal weighting is because of the lack of 
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empirical analyses. The Index will seek to attach weight to the different indicators 
in the future as more research is conducted (Baker cited in Fowler, 2006, online). 
The ratings of the PSI were produced by the use of the Conflict Assessment 
System Tool (CAST), which is a methodology developed by the Fund for Peace 
and used for early warning and assessment of internal conflicts (Failed States 
Index, 2006a, online). According to the PSI (2006a, online), CAST "incorporates 
a theoretical rationale, a conceptual framework, quantitative and qualitative 
indicators, indicator measures, and a rating system for trend analysis that can track 
a conflict over time". CAST is furthermore described as a tool that can "identify 
and anticipate failing states" (Failed States Index, 2006a, online), it has been peer 
reviewed, refined and updated over the last decade, and has been used by the US 
State Department, the Government of the Netherlands, the US Army 
Peacekeeping Institute and the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(Failed States Index, 2006a, online). 
The CAST methodology employs a four-step analysis (or five steps if the 'Pre-
Assessment Steps' is counted), however only one step, the one incorporating the 
use of the 12 indicators, is used for the FSI12 . The use ofthe indicators is designed 
to provide a snapshot of"state vulnerability or risk of violence during a window 
in time" (Failed States Index, 2006d, online). The data used for each PSI has been 
collected from May to December of the preceding year and consists of tens of 
thousands of open-source reports and articles that have been scanned by the 
CAST software. This software calculates how many positive and negative hits a 
12 For a definition of all five steps see Appendix C. 
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country receive on each of the indicators and this produces a score. The score is 
then reviewed by experts together with relevant articles, when found necessary, to 
ensure the accuracy of the score (Failed States Index, 2006d, online). 
The FSI has been praised for "injecting some much-needed precision into the 
catchall category of 'failed state"' (Patrick, 2006b, p. 7). However it has also 
received various forms of criticism. In the 2006 Index, Pakistan ranked 9th above 
countries such as Afghanistan (which was ranked 1oth), Liberia (11th) and Sierra 
Leone (16th). This attracted strong criticism from the Embassy of Pakistan in 
Washington referring to the PSI's ranking ofPakistan as "bizarre" (Shaheedi, 
2006, pp. 6-7). 
The PSI identified the massive earthquake of 2005 as the primary reason for 
Pakistan's high ranking, contributing to the country scoring extremely high on the 
social indicators of demographic pressures and refugees and displaced persons 
(Failed States Index, 2006f, online; Shaheedi, 2006, p. 6). However, the Press 
Minister ofthe Pakistani embassy, M. Akram Shaheedi (2006, pp. 6-7), argues 
that the earthquake should have had the opposite effect on the Index's ranking of 
Pakistan as it was followed by global acknowledgement ofthe well-organised 
relief and rehabilitation efforts by the government and the Pakistani people. 
Furthermore, Shaheedi pointed to Pakistan's growing economy and the 
representation of women throughout the political system as factors showing that 
the state of Pakistan should not be considered as being 'failed' (Shaheedi, 2006, 
pp. 6-7). 
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It may seem obvious that Pakistani state representatives should protest their 
country's high ranking, but the criticism from M. Akram Shaheedi highlights a 
potential problem of the FSI. It may be justified to rank Pakistan high on some of 
the indicators affected by the earthquake but the Index seems to have been 
insufficient in taking into account the excellent response of the government. This 
suggests that the 12 indicators of the Index may not always be adequate when 
evaluating the performance of a state. 
The FSI has also been criticised by Charles T. Call, an Assistant Professor of the 
School of International Service at the American University, Washington, D.C, 
who described it as a "deeply flawed enterprise" and called for it to be abandoned 
(Call, 2006, p. 9). Call argues that 'state failure' is a concept too broad to be 
useful and that the Index's limitation to 12 indicators lead to an approach that 
groups together countries that in reality are more different than alike (Call, 2006, 
p. 9). This again points to the inadequacy of using the 12 specified indicators 
when analysing the situation in a country and questions the usefulness ofthe 
Index. 
To examine the usefulness and also the shortcomings of the FSI, this thesis will 
now explore its applicability and relevance to PNG. The next chapter will 
determine how PNG has received its ranking by the Index as well as highlight 
some potential problems with the Index's analysis ofPNG. These problems will 
then be further explored through discussions on PNG's key political, economic 
and social issues. 
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Chapter 2 - PNG and the Failed States Index 
PNG did not appear on the first FSI that was published in 2005 13 (Failed States 
Index, 2005a). Therefore the FSI of2006, published in May, is the country's first 
ranking. PNG received a total score of 84.6, equalling an average score of7.05 for 
each ofthe 12 indicators, ranking it 49th in the Index (Failed States Index, 2006g, 
online). 
Table 1 
Papua New Guinea's Index score 
Category Indicator Score 
Demographic Pressures 8.0 
Social Refugees and Displaced Persons 2.5 
Indicators Group Grievances 8.0 
Human Flight 8.0 
Economic Uneven Development 9.0 
Indicators Economic Growth 7.0 
Legitimacy of the State 7.8 
Public Services 8.0 
Political Human Rights 6.1 
Indicators Security Apparatus 7.0 
Factionalised Elites 6.7 
External Influence 6.5 
TOTAL 84.6 
Source: Failed States Index, 2006g, online. 
13 The 2005 Index only 1isted the countries ranked from number one to number 60 (Failed States 
Index, 2005a, online). 
( 
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This chapter will analyse how PNG received its FSI score. It will seek to 
determine whether the scores for the different indicators are justified, and when a 
score seems to be unjustified the cases of this possible inaccuracy will be 
identified. 
The Index attributed relatively high scores to PNG on all the social indicators 
except for the refugees and displaced persons indicator as there are only a limited 
number of refugees and internally displaced people living in PNG (Failed States 
Index, 2006g, online). Of particular interest are the indicators of demographic 
pressures and group grievances as these categories have the potential to 
significantly impact on other areas in PNG. 
The demographic pressure rated 8.0 because ofPNG's population growth rate of 
2.21 %(Failed States Index, 2006g, online)14. The population growth is 
particularly high in some of the highlands regions, which has led to an increased 
number ofland disputes between different tribes (Failed States Index, 2006g, 
online). The population ofPNG has nearly doubled, from being 2.9 million at 
independence in 197{ to being 5.6 million in 2006 (The World Fact handbook, 
2006, online). The average population growth over the last decade has remained 
around a steady 2.5%15• This is a relatively high number which can be compared 
to that of 0.85 % in Australia and 1.41 % in Indonesia. The age distribution is 
heavily centred on children with 41 %of the population being under the age of 15 
14 Some of the countries that rated higher than PNG were Congo, which rated 9.5 (Failed States 
Index, 2006, online) with a population growth of 2.9% (UN, 2005, online) and Chad, which rated 
9 (Failed States Index, 2006, online) with a population growth of2.8% (UN, 2005, online). 
15 Figures on the average population growth varies between sources but is generally cited around 
2.5%, see May, (2006, p. 152); Samana, (1988, p. 61); and The World Fact Book, (2006, online). 
24 
(Morris & Stewmi, 2005, online). Therefore, the Index score of 8.0 appears to be 
justified. 
Similarly, group grievance was rated 8.0 largely because of widespread tribal 
fighting in the highlands. The PSI (2006, online) claims that much of the tribal 
fighting stems from the 2002 elections which saw politicians giving automatic 
weapons to their clansmen and encouraging them to intimidate political rivals and 
their supporters. Furthermore, the Index argues that tribes have taken up arms 
because they no longer believe in the ability of their government to mediate their 
disputes (Failed States Index, 2006g, online). 
However, inter-tribal fighting is deeply rooted in the history and traditions of 
PNG, and although the 2002 elections certainly contributed to an increase in the 
fighting, the violence must be considered in the wider picture of on-going tribal 
warfare. Additionally, group grievances is not only a highlands problem but has 
become part of the gang culture of the 'raskols' 16 in some of the larger cities 
(Ward, 2000). Therefore it could be considered that the justification of the score 
of 8.0 may be inadequate in representing the wider problems caused by group 
grievance and it follows that the score could be considered to be too low. 
Human flight was rated 8.0 as the PSI claims that PNG has seen "a large number 
of people" seeking "better opportunities" in Australia and other countries (Failed 
States Index, 2006g, online). However, the relevance of this claim may be 
questioned as 'brain-drain' is not generally cited as a problem in the literature on 
16 Criminals often attached to a criminal gang dealing in petty crimes and crimes ofviolence.(May, 
2006, p. 157). 
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PNG, and there does not seem to be any reliable data that would prove that human 
flight is indeed a significant-problem. The relatively high rating of 8.0 can 
therefore be considered to be too pigh. 
PNG scored a high 9. 0 for uneven development because of its extremely high 
levels of inequality. According to the FSI (2006, online), the top 10% ofPNG's 
population controls more than 40% of the income, with only 1.7% of the income 
being controlled by the bottom 10% ofPapua New Guineans. Furthermore, there 
is a clear division in wealth distribution between the urban and the rural areas with 
94.3% of the poor living in rural PNG (Gibson & Rozelle, 2003, online). The 
score of the Index corresponds well with PNG' s Gini ratio 17 of 51, which is the 
highest in the Asia-Pacific region (AusAid, 2006, p. 53) and 9.0 can therefore be 
considered an accurate score. 
Economic growth received a score of7.0 due to the economy being stagnant with 
the GDP growing at a rate only slightly higher than the population growth rate. 
The last two decades has seen only a limited economic growth outside of the 
mining sector, and PNG is experiencing problems in other areas, such as 
infrastructure and education, which contributes to its weak economic performance 
(Chand, 2003, p. 7; Faal, 2006, p. 18; Failed States Index, 2006g, online). It 
follows that the score of7.0 seems to be fairly accurate in reflecting the current 
situation. The FSI loosely mentions urban unemployment as being "said to be as 
17 
"The Gini ratio (or index of income concentration) is a statistical measure of income equality 
ranging fi-om 0 to 1. A measure of 1 indicates perfect inequality; one person has all the income 
and the rest have none. A measure ofO indicates perfect equality; all people have equal shares of 
income" (US Census Bureau, 2004, online). The Gini ratio can be expressed as a percentage 
between 1 and 100, i.e.' 0.51 becomes 51 which is PNG's rating. 
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high as 80 %" (Failed States Index, 2006g, online), but its economic assessment 
ofPNG does not seem to be based on any existing, accurate unemployment data. 
Therefore, the assessment resulting in the 7.0 score can be argued to be 
\ 
inconclusive. 
The legitimacy of state indicator was rated 7.8 because of institutional corruption 
and the lack of popular confidence in state institutions which has led to rising 
levels of clan fighting (Failed States Index, 2006g, online). Corruption is widely 
acknowledged as being a widespread problem in PNG (Garap, 2004, p. 2; Pitts, 
2002; Reilly, 2002b, p. 323) and clan and tribe warfare is common. Therefore the 
score of7.8 seems justified. However, PNG is experiencing other political issues 
directly linked to the legitimacy of the state, such as border and territorial control, 
which are not accounted for in this, or any other, indicator. 
PNG scored 8.0 for its public services, which are particularly lacking in remote 
areas. The chiefproblem is the lack of sufficient infrastructure18 which then 
contributes to the difficulty of providing basic public services such as education 
and healthcare to many rural areas (Failed States Index, 2006g, online). According 
to the FSI, the indicator of public services includes the protection of its citizens 
from violence but, despite this, the massive problems of crime and violence facing 
PNG is not mentioned in the Index's analysis of the public services in the country. 
Furthermore, the lack in public services such as healthcare and education is not 
linked to the larger social problem ofHIV/AIDS. This taken into consideration, it 
18 For example, according to 1999 statistics, less than five percent of roadways in PNG were paved 
(The World Fact Book, 2006, online). 
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may be suggested that either the indicator, or its score of 8.0, is insufficient in 
reflecting the real problems in PNG. 
According to the FSI (2006, online), human rights in PNG were "generally 
respected" but due to some instances of human rights abuse the country received a 
score of 6.1 for this indicator. These incidents included the police firing into a 
group of students, killing three and injuring at least 20 in October 2005 (Failed 
States Index, 2006g, online). Furthermore, conditions in prisons were said to be 
poor and police had been accused of mistreating suspects (Failed States Index, 
2006g, online). 
PNG scored 7.0 for the security apparatus indicator due to tribal militias engaging 
in armed conflicts (Failed States Index, 2006g, online). The high level of tribal 
warfare in PNG, and its links to politicians around election times, seems to justify 
this score of 7 .0, while the abstinence of an 'army within an army' and state-
sponsored militias acting on a national level kept the score from being higher19. 
However, there have been incidents of violent protests within the army, not in 
support ofleading politicians but rather to protect the army's own interests (Chin, 
2002, p. 150; Denoon, 2005, p. 178), and if this is not covered in the security 
apparatus indicator it may suggest that the indicator is too narrowly defined. 
The factionalised elites indicator of 6. 7 was based on the national government 
being dominated by local political loyalties, leading to unstable and constantly 
changing coalition governments (Failed States Index, 2006g, online). The political 
19 See full explanation of the security apparatus indicator in Appendix B. 
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loyalties have often been divided along ethnic lines (Moore, 2003, p. 197) and the 
domination of personal and -local political interests have hindered the development 
of a national consciousness (Failed States Index, 2006g, online). Therefore, the 
score of 6. 7 seems well justified. However, this indicator can be linked to wider 
political problems in PNG; problems that have their roots in the traditional values 
and the high level of social fragmentation. 
Political and social authority has traditionally been held by persons referred to as 
'big men'. According to a well recognised discussion on big men, written by 
Marshall D. Sahlins (1963), the position and functioning of a political and social 
leader in PNG (as being part of Melanesia) is significantly different from that of a 
political and social leader in neighbouring societies in Polynesia20 (Sahlins, 1963, 
pp. 203-204). The big man figure has its origins in Melanesia (Strathem, 1991, p. 
1) and an understanding ofwhat it entails and how such a position is acquired is 
essential to the understanding ofhow PNG functions. 
Traditionally, a big man in PNG has achieved this status through his own actions. 
The power of a big man is personal power; it rests with him as a person rather 
than with the position21 (Sahlins, 1963, p. 206). As stated by Sahlins (1963, p. 
206): 
Big-men do not come to office; they do not succeed to ... existing 
positions of leadership over political groups. The attainment ofbig-
man status is rather the outcome of a series of acts which elevate a 
20 However, as Sahlins (1963, p. 204) points out, differences to Polynesia are the most notable in 
western Melanesia, with societies located in eastern Melanesia being more similar to those in 
Polynesia. He defines it as a west-to-east continuum. 
21 This can be considered in contrast with a position such as a king or a president, where the power 
rests with the position and will be transferred between anyone who holds the position. The power 
of a big man is not transferable to another big man should the first big man die (or for some other 
reason cease being a big man). 
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person above the common herd and attract about him a coterie of 
loyal, lesser men. 
The deference shown a big man is an acknowledgement from the people. A rising 
big man is dependent on a core of followers, often his family and other close 
relatives. He will need to show that he possesses skills that command respect, 
such as magical powers, the mastery of oratorical style and the ability to build 
wealth (Sahlins, 1963, pp. 206-208). If he is successful, the number of people who 
follow him will increase and spread beyond family and relatives. The big man's 
authority grows with the number of his followers, but it continues to be dependent 
on personal relationships and loyalty. He can decide on the course of action and 
he dominates events in accordance with the scope ofhis relationships and wealth 
(Lemonnier, 1991, p. 10). The big man needs to constantly reinforce the loyalty 
of these relationships through his personal actions. Ifthe people who acknowledge 
him as a big man are dissatisfied they can sever their links to the big man, remove 
their support, and as a result a big man can cease being a big man (Sahlins, 1963, 
pp. 206-208). 
Sahlins' essay has received some criticism, for example from scholars pointing to 
the existence of other forms of social and political leadership in PNG. John Liep 
(1991, pp. 28-29) argues that there are tendencies in PNG for hereditary 
succession to big man status which would suggest that the position of a big man is 
not acquired solely through his personal actions. Indeed, the Mekeo people in the 
south-east ofPNG have the hereditary positions of 'chie:f and 'sorcerer' which, 
according to Mosko, are similar to positions of power in Polynesia (1991, p. 97). 
It has been argued that there are significant differences between ethnic and social 
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groups in PNG (Lederman, 1991, p. 216; Lemonnier, 1991, p. 7) and therefore 
Sahlins discussion may be seen as too simplistic. However, it is still useful to 
accept a certain degree of generalisation of the big man concept, as Sahlins 
broader definitions apply to a number of social groups in PNG, in order to 
understand the current political, economic and social structure. 
The influence ofbig men and the focus of power in individuals rather than 
political parties have led to a fragmented party system, weak coalition 
governments and a political climate where every government to date has failed to 
serve a full term (May, 2004, p. 4). These problems undermine democratic 
legitimacy and it can be argued that the indicator score of 6. 7 therefore fails to 
cover the extent of the factionalised elites problem in an accurate way. 
The final indicator, external influence, had PNG scoring 6.5 because of its close 
ties with Australia. The FSI explains this rating by pointing to the Enhanced 
Cooperation Program (ECP) of June 200422, which was later suspended in May 
2005, and by referring to the "close involvement of Australia in Papua New 
Guinea's internal affairs" (Failed States Index, 2006g, online). However, using the 
ECP as an example of justification for the score seems inconsistent with the 
methodology ofthe Index as each year's rankings are allegedly based on data 
collected from "May to December of the preceding year" (Failed States Index, 
2006d, online). 
22 The Enhanced Cooperation Program was designed to help address PNG's development 
challenges in the areas oflaw and order, justice, economic management, public sector reform, 
border control and transport security and safety. The program was agreed upon in December 2003, 
and a treaty was signed by the Australian and PNG governments in June 2004 (Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006c, online). 
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The FSI also points to PNG'·s dependence on Australian aid which accounted for 
20% ofPNG's budget (Failed States Index, 2006g, online; The World Fact Book, 
2006, online). Indeed, this seems justified as the definition of the external 
influence indicator includes the "tendency towards over-dependence on foreign 
aid" (Failed States Index, 2006h, online). However, it can be suggested that it is 
insufficient to consider PNG' s dependence on foreign aid as a solely political 
problem without linking it to the economic situation in the country. 
Having analysed how PNG received its FSI score, it is obvious that this lack of 
linking between different indicators, within and across the three categories (social, 
economic and political), is one of the Index's shortcomings. The economic 
problems in PNG are clearly linked to its high rate of population growth, falling 
under the social indicator of demographic pressure, and the external influence 
problem of Australia's involvement in PNG politics is largely due to the aid 
program, therefore linking it to economic issues. 
The FSI also fails in recognising the wider problems caused by issues discussed 
under the indicators of group grievance and the security apparatus, suggesting that 
these indicators are too narrowly defined. However, these short-comings could be 
caused by the lack of accessible information on how the Index justifies its scores, 
and may have been taken into consideration without it being noticed in the 
literature. If this is the case, criticism should then rather be directed at the amount 
of information made available by the Index as to how they calculated their scores. 
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There are also some clear issues in PNG not covered by the Index, which 
contribute significantly to the stability and well-functioning of the country. These 
issues include lack of control over borders and territory, problems posed by a 
HIV/AIDS23 epidemic, and crime and violenceproblems related to a deteriorating 
law and order situation. Law and order is indeed covered by some of the Index 
indicators, however, the issues of crime and violence in PNG are so severe they 
need to be discussed as a separate issue that can then be related to other areas. 
Furthermore, the indicators do not include an analysis of unemployment figures24, 
which can be argued to be an important economic and social indicator for a 
country. Therefore, an insufficient number of indicators is another of the Index's 
shortcomings. 
The methodology used in the FSI adds to its overall deficiencies. The time frame 
for the research, as specified in the methodology, seems to have been 
inconsistently used when considering the Index's justification for the external 
influence score. However, the use of information collected outside of the research 
window may well be justified. For example, it will be argued that the history of 
the Bougainville conflict is still influencing the stability in PNG and should 
therefore be considered when analysing the country. This poses the question of 
whether the use of a research window is insufficient for an accurate evaluation, as 
events that have taken place before the time frame of the research window can be 
crucial to the understanding of current issues. 
23 According to the Failed States Index (2006b, online), HIV/AIDS is a "sub-indictor" but it does 
not state which indicator it is related to and is not further referred to in the discussion on PNG. 
24 The Failed States Index (2006g, online) refers to an unemployment figure of 80% for urban 
areas but does not discuss the problem further. 
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An attempt, such as the PSI, ·to assess countries based on a specific set of 
indicators will always receive criticisms. As observers will approach such an 
attempt in different ways there will always be the issue of whether the 'right' 
indicators are being used; the 'important' problems discussed. Different observers 
will inevitably have different opinions. This thesis will now examine issues in 
PNG that highlight the shortcomings of the Index as identified in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3 - The Failed States Index and the Political situation in PNG 
Since 197 4, the number of democracies worldwide has quadrupled to incorporate 
120 nations (Koh, 2000, online). However, the extent to which all these nations 
abide by the core principles of democracy is open to debate. According to Rotberg 
(2003, p. 3), a state is required to enable its citizens to "participate freely, openly, 
and fully in politics" and that democratic states have the ability to respond to 
popular discontent as well as a political system that accommodates challenges 
from dissident political groups. Additionally, a democracy can protect its citizens 
against massive human rights abuse. Therefore, democracies "fail to fail" 
(Rotberg, 2003, pp. 20-21). 
Democracy has been prevalent in PNG since independence in 1975 and, according 
to Myron Weiner in 1987 (cited in Reilly, 2000, pp. 171-172), this put PNG in a 
group of only six developing nations with a population of more than one million 
that had remained democratic since its independence25. More recently, PNG was 
classified by Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset as a stable 
democracy together with only four other developing countries26 (cited in Reilly, 
2000, p. 172). 
This survival of a democratic political system in PNG may seem somewhat 
surprising considering that a high level of social fragmentation has been cited by 
several scholars as undermining democratic stability (Reilly, 2000, pp. 162-163). 
25 The other five countries cited by Weiner were India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago (Reilly, 2000, pp. 171-172). 
26 The other four countries cited by Diamond, Linz and Lipset were Venezuela, Costa Rica, India 
and Botswana (Reilly, 2000, p. 172). 
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However, the unique political culture, which is interconnected with the social 
fragmentation in PNG, has a clear effect on how the democratic institutions are 
allowed to function and democracy does not necessarily mean that PNG will 'fail 
to fail'. 
PNG is experiencing severe problems linked to the legitimacy of the state as well 
as internal and external security issues. This chapter will discuss these problems 
and analyse how they reflect on the usefulness of the FSI. It will show that there 
are shortcomings in the way the Index's indicators present the political situation in 
PNG and that there are clearly political problems that the Index does not account 
for. To be able to analyse the political situation in PNG, its unique cultural climate 
(or, indeed, number of cultural climates) must be considered. 
Due to its high levels of social fragmentation, PNG has faced a continuous 
problem of creating a feeling of nationhood among its citizens. The country is 
now thirty years on from its independence and this problem still persists. Many 
Papua New Guineans still place their loyalties and allegiances with the local 
community before the state (May, 2006, p. 152). Apart from having roots in 
cultural tradition, this problem is also the by product of natural causes, such as the 
lack of interconnection due to the dramatic geographical terrain. Shortcomings by 
the state in providing sufficient infrastructure have further hampered its ability to 
establish its presence across remote areas of the nation. 
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According to May (2006, p. 161), the public services in PNG have seen an 
increased level of politicisation over the two previous decades, which has 
contributed to factions of the population disengaging from the state and a 
widespread corresponding attitude that the state has little legitimacy. This has led 
to situations, especially in the highlands, where local community big men have a 
significantly higher level of influence over the locals, than have the elected state 
political representatives. 
This form of political culture is further sustained by the characteristics of the party 
system in PNG. It is a weak system where the parties are differentiated mainly by 
their place of origin instead of political ideologies (Moore, 2003, p. 197). Rather 
than voting for a candidate of a specific party, the majority of Papua New 
Guineans let personality determine their vote; they vote for someone from their 
own clan or tribe, or a person advised by their clan leader, as their social loyalty is 
significantly stronger than their political loyalty (May, 2006, p. 164; Reilly, 2000, 
p. 170). As a consequence, although citizens have the opportunity to participate in 
the political process by voting, they strengthen their bonds with local leaders and 
become more alienated from state leaders whom they see as having little or no 
connection to their own community. 
The nature of the first-past-the-post electoral system27 results in a high number of 
candidates contesting each seat in parliament, which leads to a high turnover of 
MPs from one election to another. According to May (2006, p. 164), the typical 
percentage of turnover in all elections since independence has been between 50 
27 As opposed to a preferential voting system. PNG has passed legislation to move from first-past-
the-post to optional preferential voting, and the new electoral system will be used for the first time 
in next year's national elections. 
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and 55 %. This high level turnover means that it has been difficult for successive 
governments to maintain any long-term national policies. Whatever is good for 
individual MPs on a short-term basis receives more attention than issues 
important to the long-term national good ofPNG (May, 2006, p. 164) and this has 
played a part in PNG failing to develop into a strong, modem nation. 
These problems, which can be typified as a clash between political culture and 
democratic ideals, are not recognised as such by the PSI. However, they cannot be 
ignored when analysing the political problems of the legitimacy of the state and 
the control of its borders and territory. 
The PSI (2005, online) identified criminalisation and I or delegitimisation of the 
state as an indication of state failure and that this can be characterised by 
widespread corruption of the ruling elites. Corruption has been acknowledged to 
be a large problem in PNG by several scholars (Denoon, 2005, pp. 172-177; Pitts, 
2002; Reilly, 2002b, p. 323). A number ofPNG governments and individual 
governmental officials have been under scrutiny for being corrupt, and this is 
another significant reason why the country has seen such frequent change in 
government since independence. To exemplify the country's political volatility: 
an elected government has yet to serve out a full term as every government to date 
has been replaced at least once on the floor of the parliament through the use of a 
no-confidence vote28 (Dorney, 1990, p. 53; May, 2006, p. 164; Reilly, 2000, p. 
180). 
28 A motion of no-confidence can be directed against the "Prime Minister, the Ministry or a 
Minister, as the case may be", it needs to give "not less than one week's notice" and be "signed by 
a number of members cif the Parliament being not less than one-tenth of the total number of seats 
in the Parliament" (PNG Constitution, s 145:1a, s 145:lb). In the constitution a newly elected 
38 
This use of the no-confidence vote and frequent change of government has led to 
the functioning of the executive, as well as the legislative branches of 
government, being compromised as politicians have become more focused on 
their own political survival rather than on what is best for the nation (May, 2006, 
p. 164; Reilly, 1999, pp. 233-234). For example, Prime Minister Bill Skate who 
had come to power after the 1997 election used the tactic of adjourning the 
parliament to escape a no-confidence vote. 
In 1998, Skate was accused of bribery but was cleared of the allegations due to a 
lack of"concrete evidence" (Wesley-Smith, 1999, p. 439). Skate then accused his 
former Deputy Prime Minister, Chris Haiveta, of involvement in the bribery 
accusations and of conspiring in an attempt to discredit Skate and his government. 
As a consequence, Haiveta's party, the Pangu Pati, was dropped from the 
coalition government and the reshuffling of posts that followed left many 
parliamentarians dissatisfied as they lost influence and power. After having failed 
to introduce changes to the constitution, designed to make it much more difficult 
to remove the elected Prime Minister, Skate faced the possibility of a no-
confidence vote against him (Wesley-Smith, 1999, p. 439). Once his 'safe-period' 
was over he therefore chose to adjourn Parliament for eight months to avoid such 
a vote and, hopefully, to rally support among the MPs29• 
government was granted a 'safe-period' of six months from the date they were installed, during 
which no vote of no-confidence could be proposed. Likewise, a vote of no-confidence can not be 
used against a government during its final year leading up to an election. In 1991, in an attempt to 
create a more stable working environment for a new government, the 'safe-period' after an 
election was extended to 18 months, leaving a period of two and a half years in the middle of a 
term when a governmeht can face a no-confidence vote (Saffu, 1998, p. 504). 
29 Skate eventually lost office in July, 1999 (May, 2004, p. 6). 
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Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta used similar tactics to avoid a no-confidence 
vote the year after Skate (Chin, 2002, p. 150). In late 1999, he adjourned 
parliament until July 2001 when his 12 months safe-period leading up to the 2002 
elections was due to begin. Chin (2002, p. 150) argues that as a result of 
Morauta's actions, much ofthe national politics in PNG during the first half of 
2001 was focused on trying to get the Prime Minister to recall parliament, 
however Morauta held out. These two examples show how both the stability and 
the functionality of the PNG government are undermined when a political tool 
ultimately designed to ensure the nation's democracy- the no-confidence vote in 
combination with a fractured party system - is used by a politician in order for 
him to protect himself30. 
In addition to political instability, the legitimacy ofPNG as a state is undermined 
by problems in maintaining both internal and external security; an issue that the 
FSI fails to deal with directly. Although PNG has been largely free from the threat 
of outside intervention, it has seen security breeches along its borders as well as 
severe domestic challenges. 
PNG has experienced some trouble along its western border with the Indonesian 
province of Papua (formerly known as Irian Jaya). As Papua has long hosted a 
separatist movement (the Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM, translated to the Free 
Papua Movement) seeking the province's independence from Indonesia, PNG has 
at times served as a haven for Papuan separatists fleeing Indonesian authorities. 
As a consequence, PNG has been,accused by its neighbours of actively aiding the 
30 Gelu (2006, pp. 413-414) argues that adjourning parliament to avoid a no-confidence vote has 
become "the norm in Papua New Guinea politics" and discusses similar tactics used by the current 
PM, Michael Somare. 
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OPM and this has caused strains in the PNG-Indonesian relationship (May, 2006, 
p. 155). 
The PNG- Papuan border has also been the recent focus of criticism from Papua 
New Guineans questioning border security. The PNG Defence Force commander 
Commodore Peter Ilau confirmed that there had been a lapse in security at the 
Wutung post and the Skou post in West Sepik between 5.10 pm and 7.30 am from 
the 101h to the 11th of July, 2006 ("Security Concerns", 2006, online). He 
expressed his concerns about the main access route in at the Wutung post not 
being manned after-hours, stating that "from about 5.10 in the afternoon to 7.30 in 
the morning we do not know what or who is or who has illegally crossed into our 
country" (Ilau cited in "Security Concerns", 2006, online). The problems with the 
manning of the border posts was explained by Commodore Ilau as being caused 
by inadequate resources; the Wutung post having only five police officers 
available. "There is no 24-hour, seven-days-a-week security at our main border 
post" said Ilau, referring to the problem as a "key issue" in "times of scarce 
resources" (Ilau cited in "Security Concerns", 2006, online). 
The security on the border with Papua was also criticised by retired Major-
General and former commander of the PNGDF, Jerry Singirok, who claimed that 
it posed a grave threat to Australia ("Australia warned", 2006, online). Singirok 
argued that due to Canberra's push to cut the PNGDF, influencing a downsizing 
of the force from more than 5,000 to no more than 2,000 troops, border security 
was being "severely compromised" ("Australia warned", 2006, online). He further 
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stated that there were few or no troops in place to patrol the border, leaving it 
exposed to "illegal and suspicious migrants" ("Australia warned", 2006, online). 
The lack of adequate security on the border has led to claims that the Indonesian 
terrorist group Jemaah Islamiah has relatively easy access to PNG where they 
could then attack Australian mining and energy interests: 
Any terrorist with intention (to do harm) would obviously strike where 
there's no defence, no security systems in place ... [i]f they cannot hit 
Australia on its home soil, they're going to hit Australia where it 
hurts ... [t]here's billions of dollars of Australian investment in PNG 
and there's a relatively significant population of Australians (Singirok, 
cited in "Australia warned", 2006). 
Singirok referred to the downsizing ofthe PNG Defence Force as being 
"humiliating" and a "security blunder" and that it compromised regional security 
(Singirok, cited in "Australia warned", 2006). 
The PNG government not only experiences problems in controlling its borders, 
but it also faces severe domestic security i~sues. Claxton (2000, p. 263) identified 
" 
three key internal security challenges facing the country as being crime, tribal 
fighting and separatism31 . The most severe separatist movement, leading to civil 
war, was that on the island ofBougainville. 
The violent conflict in Bougainville was ended by a permanent cease-fire in 1998, 
however, issues regarding the political status of the Bougainville province have 
yet to be resolved. In addition, the conflict has had a significant impact on the 
31 The surging violence in both cities and the remote areas of the highlands will be further 
discussed in chapter 6 as being part of social issues. 
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political and economic situation in the country and therefore it is relevant to any 
analysis of current political -issues. 
The Bougainville conflict was centred on the Panguna copper mine; however the 
mine has been argued to have been a catalyst for the conflict rather then its cause 
(Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 1999, p. 13). 
The conflict was the consequence of a number of pre-existing issues which are all 
inter-related: 
In the complex political, economic and cultural situation of 
Bougainville, it is na'ive and misleading to attempt to analyse the 
origins of the conflict in terms of single causes .... Each factor tended 
to reinforce the importance of other factors at different times (Regan 
quoted in Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade, 1999, p. 14). 
Regan (1998, pp. 272-276) identifies increased economic inequality in 
Bougainville after the Second World War as detrimental to the economic and 
social climate in which the Panguna mine was opened in 1969. The mine was 
controfled and operated by the Bougainville Mining Company (later Bougainville 
Copper Ltd., BCL) which was a subsidiary of the Australian mining company 
CRA (Conzinc Riotinto of Australia Ltd), and the PNG government (Joint 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 1999, p. 13; Turner, 
2001, p. 27). Concern arose among some Bougainvilleans that they did not 
receive their fair share of the profits from the mine (Turner, 2001, p. 27), and that 
local land rights were not respected by BCL and the PNG government (Regan, 
1998, pp. 274-275). Their concern may seem justified considering that the PNG 
government received more than $1 billion in the period up until the closure ofthe 
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mine, compared to the $33 million having been paid to the landowners (Joint 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 1999, pp. 17-18). 
As a result of the local opposition to the Panguna copper mine, the New Panguna 
Landowners Association (NPLA) was formed in the 1980s under the leadership of 
Francis Ona. In April1988, the NPLA demanded a 50% share in BCL profits, 
that the BCL ownership be localised within five years, as well as greater 
environmental control and hefty compensation for profits made by the BCL (Joint 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1999, p. 21; Turner, 2001, p. 
28). When these demands were not met, the armed faction ofthe NPLA, the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), started a wave of sabotage and 
terrorism on the mine and forced its closure in May 1989 (Turner, 2001, pp. 28-
29). 
The actions of the BRA prompted the PNG government to declare a state of 
emergency in Bougainville in June 1989, and 2,000 soldiers and armed riot police 
were sent in (Turner, 2001, p. 29). After nine months of fighting between the 
BRA and the PNG security forces, the government withdrew its forces in March 
1990 and replaced its armed presence with an economic and communications 
blockade on Bougainville. The BRA then announced that their province (then 
named the North Solomons Province) had seceded from PNG, and Ona declared it 
to be the independent Republic ofMe'ekamui (Joint Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1999, p. 23). This action was declared unconstitutional 
by the PNG government, and negotiations between Bougainville and PNG 
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representatives followed, however they were all unsuccessful (Turner, 2001, p. 
29). 
The PNGDF was slowly returned to Bougainville over the next few years, and 
basic government services followed. However, the blockade was effectively in 
place until 1994 and some parts of Bougainville did not see a return of 
government administration and services until after the peace process had begun in 
1997 (Regan, 2005, p. 443). Meanwhile, the fighting continued between the BRA 
and the PNGDF, escalating further during 1995 and 1996, seeing the assassination 
of the elected premier ofBougainville, Theodore Miriung, in October, 1995 
(O'Callaghan, 1999, p. 28; Turner, 2001, p. 30). 
In 1997, the PNG Prime Minister Julius Chan, supported by his Defence Minister 
Mathias Ijape and Deputy Prime Minister Chris Haiveta, hired mercenaries in an 
attempt to defeat the Bougainville rebellion (Joint Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, 1999, pp. 29-39; Turner, 2001, pp. 28, 30). However, the 
operation was abandoned after the Commander of the PNGDF, Brigadier General 
Jerry Singirok turned against his prime minister and took action to remove the 
mercenaries as he felt that there could be no military solution to the Bougainville 
problem and he also considered the mercenary contract to be economically 
unsustainable and referred to it as "suicide for PNG" (Singirok, cited in 
O'Callaghan, 1999, pp. 40-41). 
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Chan, Haiveta and Ijape were forced to stand down over this incident which 
became known as the Sandline affair. According to the Joint Standing Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999, p. 39), the collapse ofthe Sandline contract 
ended the option of a military solution and instead paved the way for a peaceful 
end to the Bougainville rebellion. 
After the permanent cease-fire agreement in April1998 the Bougainville Peace 
Process continued to move forward, with the Bougainville Peace Agreement being 
signed in August 2001. This agreement provided for elections for the 
establishment of autonomous government, as well as for a referendum on 
Bougainvillean independence to be held in 10 to 15 years (Department ofForeign 
Affairs and Trade, 2006, online). 
Elections for the autonomous government were successfully held in 200532, 
resulting in the first Bougainville President, former rebel leader Joseph Kabui, 
together with 39 members of the Autonomous Bougainville Government being 
sworn into office (Department ofForeign Affairs and Trade, 2006, online). 
Although the civil war in the Bougainville province has ended, the issue of 
Bougainville still poses problems for the PNG government. Not only has it lost 
the revenue of the Panguna copper mine, but the successful uprising of locals 
protesting against the mine could be argued as being inspirational to other Papua 
New Guineans living around areas which are being exploited for their natural 
resources. 
32 According to Gelu (2006, p. 417), the election was "peaceful", "well prepared" and "well 
conducted". 
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For example, on the 1st of August, 2006, a state of emergency was declared in the 
province ofthe Southern Highlands ("Threats to Shut Project", 2006, online). The 
government justified the decision by stating that the law and order situation in the 
province was fast deteriorating with a recent surge in local violence, threatening 
gas and mining in the area. The governor of the Southern highlands was extremely 
unhappy with the situation, threatening to shut down a gas-pipe project with 
Queensland and calling for PM Somare's resignation ("Threats to Shut Project", 
2006, online). This shows how locals can work their influence in a way which is 
compromising the legitimacy of the state and with the potential of causing future 
large-scale problems. 
The security issues connected with the lack of governmental control over its 
borders and territory are severe enough to be considered as having an influence on 
PNG' s stability and performance as a state. However, they are not directly 
covered by any of the indicators of the FSI, therefore highlighting shortcomings in 
the Index's ability to rate political issues in PNG. Furthermore, the Index's 
indicators are too specific, and its window·ofresearch too narrow, to sufficiently 
consider the problems posed by the political culture in PNG. 
The issue of Bougainville serves as criticism of the research window as it seems 
insufficient to analyse a country based on data collected during such a limited 
time period. It is clear that past events can still have an effect on current events, 
and therefore, the Index should have the capacity to take into consideration a 
country's past when assessing its current situation. An assessment based solely on 
data collected during the year before could prove to be lacking in historical 
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context and, therefore, the severity of current problems run the risk of being 
understated. 
48 
Chapter 4 - The Failed States Index and the Economic situation in 
PNG 
PNG scored extremely high (9.0) on the FSI indicator of uneven development, and 
relatively high (7.0) on the indicator for economic growth. The Index therefore 
suggests that PNG faces severe economic problems, but that the primary problem 
lies in the area of distribution of development and wealth rather than in the 
economy itself. However, this is not necessarily the case as the country's 
economic growth is insufficient to accommodate the high rate of population 
growth, hitting the already poor in the rural sector particularly hard. The indicator 
for economic growth's rating of7.0 seems to be too low and it needs to be linked 
to the one of uneven development to allow for a more accurate analysis. 
Furthermore, the Index does not consider the specific problems ofPNG's 
economic dependency on aid from Australia and other donors and therefore, the 
Index's assessment of the PNG economy is only partly accurate. 
According to Gibson and Rozelle (2003, online), PNG is very rich in natural 
resources; however it has a Gini ratio that is one of the highest in the world 
(Gibson & Rozelle, 2003, online). This means that the wealth ofthe country is 
unevenly distributed with a significant gap between the rich and the poor. 
Eighty five percent ofPNG's population lives in rural areas and they are heavily 
reliant on their capability to grow their own food and other cash crops that provide 
them with money used to cover some of their education and health costs (Morris 
& Stewart, 2005, online). PNG has seen an increase in the number of people 
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living below the national poverty line, with an estimation of 54 % of the 
population living below the line in 2003 compared to 37.5% in 1996 (Morris & 
Stewart, 2005, online). If the level of poverty is measured using the international 
standard of poverty as being less than US$1 per day, the corresponding figures 
would be roughly a rise from 25% to 40% (Morris & Stewart, 2005, online). The 
poverty in PNG has been identified as mainly caused by: weak governance; weak 
social support systems; inefficient use of natural resources; lack of economic and 
financial growth opportunities; a poorly maintained infrastructure network; and 
the inefficient delivery of, and lack of access to, basic services (Morris & Stewart, 
2005, online). 
PNG has a dual economy, consisting of the formal, corporate based economy, and 
the informal economy largely based on subsistence farming (Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006b, online, 2006, online). The formal sector 
employs a minority of the population within the mineral industry, the public 
sector, and the service industries of finance, construction, transportation and 
utilities. The informal sector employs a large number of the population as it is the 
main employer in the rural areas (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
2006b, online). The last decade has seen a trend of migration of people from the 
rural areas and the informal sector, to the main cities and an opportunity to work 
in the formal sector. However this has contributed to unemployment problems 
causing further social problems in the cities (Department ofForeign Affairs and 
Trade, 2006b, online; May, 2006, p. 152). 
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The Statistical Office of Papua New Guinea reported the unemployment rate for 
the year 2000 as being 2.8% (Statistical Office of Papua New Guinea, 2006, 
online). However, due to a large percentage of the population being employed in 
the informal sector together with a lack of reliable up-to-date data, the 
unemployment rate is likely to be much higher. For example, the unemployment 
figure for young men in urban areas has been estimated at 40% (AusAID, 2006, p. 
53, online). BBC correspondent Nick Squires (2004, online) cites the 
unemployment figure for Port Moresby as being as high as 70%, while Maxine 
Pitts (2002, p. 36) states that the number was 60% in 2001. According to the 
Index, unemployment in some urban areas is said to be as high as 80 % (FSI, 
2006, online). Furthermore, unemployment figures are continuously rising and 
PNG also has a high level of people who are underemployed (AusAID, 2006, p. 
53). 
PNG's real national levels ofthe Gross Domestic Product (GDP)33 have decreased 
by nearly 50% since independence, and recent years have continued to show a 
negative economic trend (Faal, 2006, online). Due to strong performances in the 
sectors of mining and petroleum, the economy grew quite rapidly between 1991 
and 1994. However, after 1994 the economy slowed down and high inflation 
combined with a rapid population increase to produce a fall in per capita incomes 
by an estimated 18% between 1994 and 2002 (Morris & Stewart, 2005, online). 
The GDP per capita declined at an annual average rate of 1.4% from 1992 to 
2002 (Chand, 2003, p. 7). 
33 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the total value of goods and services produced in a country. 
Real GDP is GDP adjusted for inflation, providing the GDP value in constant dollars (Federal 
Reserve Bank ofMinneapolis, 2004, online). 
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The last couple of years have seen some signs of an economic recovery with real 
annual GDP expanding by roughly 3 % and the non-mineral GDP figures rising 
an estimated 3.5% (IMF Mission Team, 2006, online). These positive numbers 
have been the result of strong global commodity prices and the success of the 
Papua New Guinean government in maintaining disciplined fiscal policies with a 
well balanced budget (World Bank, 2006, online; Morris & Stewart, 2005, 
online). However, as the rapid population growth is expected to continue, an 
economy growing at about 3 % each year will not be enough to ensure a sufficient 
increase in per capita income over the medium term and therefore, PNG is still 
facing serious economic problems (Morris & Stewart, 2005, online). 
Table 2 
GOP per capita 1999 - 2003 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
GDP per capita (US$) 686 664 553 512 566 
Source: Morris & Stewart, 2005, online. 
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At the time of its independence, PNG and Australia were hopeful that PNG would 
develop into a modem, capitalist economy. However, PNG has been unable to 
develop a self-reliant economy and has therefore remained dependent on foreign 
aid from Australia. 
Currently, PNG is receiving A$300 million in annual aid from Australia (Morris 
and Stewart, 2005, online). The aid program has four key priorities as identified 
by Morris and Stewart (2005, online): fostering sustainable development 
(transport infrastructure and renewable resources); building stronger governance; 
developing institutional capacity (governance, law and order, health and 
education), and addressing HIV/AIDS. 
In an attempt to make Australian aid more effective, the focus and the character of 
the aid has been gradually changed over the last decade from having its emphasis 
on budget aid to now being focused on program aid. Prior to the change, 
Australian aid was given straight to the PNG government, allowing it relative 
freedom in how the money was being used. The policy was changed in the late 
1980s to provide for a greater transparency in how aid is being used, as program 
focused aid can be more closely monitored (AusAID, 2003, p. 25). Program 
focused aid means that the money contributed to PNG is intended for certain 
programs and will be distributed in accordance with the guidelines of these 
programs. The government ofPNG has therefore lost some of its control over how 
the money is being spent. However, the revised system of aid has allowed 
observers to better track its effectiveness. 
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The way in which Australia's aid contribution to PNG is used has been questioned 
in some circles with allegations that the money is wasted due to ineffectiveness 
and corruption (May, 2006, p. 167). Windybank and Manning argues that 
Australia's generous aid contribution has allowed successive PNG governments to 
"live beyond their means, encouraging irresponsible policies and postponing the 
need for reform" (Windybank and Manning, 2004, p. 12). However, the 
withdrawal of Australian aid is not seen as an option because Australia has a 
moral responsibility from having been PNG' s Colonial master. The aid is equally 
important for security reasons as Australian aid has been recognised by successive 
Canberra administrations as being essential to PNG's ability to satisfy the basic 
needs of its citizens and maintain law and order (May, 2006, p. 167). 
Although the PNG economy has shown some positive signs in recent years, the 
economic issues facing the nation are still severe and the economic performance 
will need to dramatically improve to ensure that PNG copes with its high rate of 
population growth. Therefore, the possibility exists that the FSI score of7.0 is not 
accurate as it fails to adequately consider the integration of a range of issues 
undermining the fragility ofPNG's economy. Furthermore, the Index's economic 
indicators are too narrowly defined; alternatively, it needs to link its economic 
indicators to the political indicator of external influence, to properly incorporate 
the influence ofPNG's dependency on foreign aid on its economic situation. 
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Chapter 5- The Failed States Index and the Social situation in PNG 
As a developing country with a limited economic base, securing a livelihood 
remains a challenge for most ofPNG's population. ill fact, according to Morris 
and Stewart (2005, online), PNG has the Pacific's worst social indicators, and its 
human development indicator has remained poor in relation to its per capita 
income. The UN publishes an index to measure human development and in the 
latest Human Development fudex, which was based on 2003 statistics, PNG 
ranked 13 7th out of 177 countries, and the trend over the last few years has been 
negative (UN, 2005, online). Human development in PNG is lower than in any of 
its neighbouring countries included in the fudex, and it rates PNG below several 
African nations. 
Table 3 
Socia/ Indicators for Selected Pacific Nations 
Country Infant Life Population Adult 
mortality expectancy growth literacy 
per 1000 at birth35 rate36 %37 
birthi4 
Fiji 18.0 69.3 0.7 93.2 
Nauru 10.3 62.0 2.4 95.0 
PNG 61.0 57.4 2.7 64.6 
Solomon 20.0 68.7 3.4 76.6 Islands 
Tonga 13.3 68.6 0.3 99.0 
Vanuatu 34.0 68.3 2.7 34.0 
Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004, p. 7. 
34 2002 or latest data (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004, p. 7). 
35 2002 or latest data (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004, p. 7). 
36 Annual average for 2002 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004, p. 7). 
Gross 
enrolment 
ratio38 
81.3 
79.5 
28.6 
37.7 
83.3 
57.4 
37 For ages 15 and above, 2002 or latest data (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004, p. 
7). 
38 Combined ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment in 1998 (Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, 2004, p. 7). 
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Table 4 
Socia/ Indicators for Selected South East Asian Nations and PNG 
Country Life Adult Gross GDPper 
expectancy literacy enrolment capita 
at birtlt39 %40 Ratio % 41 (US$/2 
Indonesia 66.8 87.9 66 3,361 
Malaysia 73.2 88.7 71 9,512 
PNG 55.3 57.3 41 2,619 
Singapore 78.7 92.5 87 24,481 
Source: UN Human Development Index, 2005, online. 
PNG is currently facing two social problems that are particularly pressing, neither 
of which is represented by an indicator in the FSI: crime and violence and 
HIV/AIDS. 
Serious crime in PNG has increased by four percent a year since 1990, and it is 
argued by Pitts (2002, p. 36, 98) that crime is the single biggest deterrent to 
political, economic and social growth. According to statistics from 199743, the 
annual .violent crime rate in PNG was 2,000 incidents per 100,000, which is ten 
times higher then in Australia and six times higher then in Fiji44 (Chand, 1997, 
online). In reality, the number of crimes is likely much higher as most crimes go 
undetected by the state and are not included in official statistics (Dinnen, 2001, p. 
3). 
39 2002 years data (UN Human Development Index, 2005, online). 
40 Ages 15 and above, 2002 years data (UN Human Development Index, 2005, online). 
41 Combined ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment in 2001/2002 (UN Human 
Development Index, 2005, online). 
42 2002 years data (UN Human Development Index, 2005, online). 
43 See discussion in conclusion on the problem of reliable recent crime statistics. 
44 Fiji is used for the comparison as it is a "Pacific island nation with a number of socioeconomic 
similaritites to Papua New Guinea" (Chand, 1997, p. 2). 
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The main cities in PNG, and especially the capital Port Moresby, have seen a 
trend of an increasing level of crimes and violence. Port Moresby has been 
referred to as one of the most dangerous cities in the world based on data 
presented by the UN (Levantis cited in May, 2006, p. 158). The main cause of 
crime and violence in the capital is the presence of so called raskols; criminals 
dealing in petty crimes and crimes of violence and often attached to different 
gangs (Dinnen, 2001, pp. 55-59; May, 2006, pp. 157-158; Squires, 2004, online). 
These raskol gangs are a product of high unemployment figures, which hit young 
men particularly hard45 . There is a pattern of young men migrating from rural to 
urban areas, hoping to find a job and pursue their economic interests in a way that 
would not be possible in the remote areas of the country, swelling the number of 
unemployed (May, 2006, p. 152). There are economic opportunities in the cities, 
mostly in Port Moresby, however these opportunities are only available to a 
fortunate few and a large number find themselves isolated and marginalised in a 
foreign city. To join a raskol gang can then provide the means of surviving on 
criminal activities and of creating an identity (Dinnen, 2001, p. 58; Ward, 2000, 
pp. 223-235). Pitts (2002, p. 36) argues that young males with no money and 
little to do seek out targets for theft and aggression, resulting in armed robberies, 
assaults and cmj acking. 
45 See chapter 4. 
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Gender-based violence against women in PNG is widespread and pervasive, 
however, due to the lack of reliable and accurate data, the full extent ofthe 
problem is unknown (Amnesty International, 2006a, online). In many areas of the 
country women are not free to move safely around in their communities or walk to 
school or work, as crimes such as rape, gang-rape and assaults are common 
(Amnesty International, 2006b, online). Traditional village customs that served as 
deterrents have weakened and are largely absent when young people move from 
their village to a larger town or city (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor, 2001, online). Furthermore, many communities are willing to settle 
incidents of rape through material compensation instead of criminal prosecutions 
and this contributes to the difficulty in combating rape crimes (Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2001, online). 
Violence is also frequent in the highlands regions ofPNG. Inter-clan warfare has 
traditionally been one of the most regular points of contact between clans, and it 
can be regarded as a cultural phenomenon; a part oflife (Lemonnier, 1991, p. 9; 
Strathern, 1979, pp. 49-84). In the dramatic geographical terrain made up from 
mountain ranges and deep valleys and with the infrastructure being extremely 
poor, the presence of state leaders and police is scarce and therefore the violence 
is allowed to continue. May (2006, pp. 166-167)identifies the problem as being 
one within the bureaucracy of inadequate resources as well as reflecting 
"widespread lack of acceptance ofthe authority of the state". In many areas of the 
highlands, police and defence troops are both out-numbered and out-gunned 
(May, 2006, p. 167; Squires, 2005, online). 
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Violence has especially been prevalent around election times46, with several 
elections being compromised and the latest election in 2002 widely regarded as 
the most violent election in the country's history (Garap, 2004, p. 2). Sir Michael 
Somare, a highly experienced politician and the current Prime Minister, referred 
to the 2002 election as "the worst he had ever seen in his political life" (May, 
2006, p. 165). 
Reilly (1997, p. 27) argued that election related violence can be seen as "rational 
(if anti-social) behaviour in the face of an inappropriate system". With a high 
number of contesting candidates due to the first-past-the-post election system the 
result is a low level of support for the winner. Therefore, the number of votes 
separating the winning candidate from that with the second highest number of 
votes could potentially be relatively low. It follows that the impact violence could 
have on supporters of the opposition, for example to intimidate them into voting 
for a different candidate or to stop them from voting altogether, would sometimes 
be enough to make a significant difference to the election outcome (Reilly, 1997, 
p.27). 
This connection between personal gain for individual politicians and a 
deteriorating law and order situation again show how several of the main issues in 
PNG span across the Index's categories and indicators. Crime and violence 
deserves its own indicator to sufficiently evaluate its influence on the stability of 
PNG, and this indicator needs to be closely linked to political and economic 
problems. The Index is clearly insufficient in linking problems across categories 
46 See Dinnen (2001, chapter 6) and Rumsey (1999) for further discussion on election related 
violence. 
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as is also evident when examining what is possibly the most severe social problem 
facing PNG; the emerging HIV I AIDS epidemic. 
Politicians in PNG have admitted that they have failed in responding to the rapid 
spread ofHIV/AIDS, leaving the disease unmanaged for 15 years ("Sick No 
Good", 2006). This has left PNG in a situation where people are uneducated and 
the health care system is unable to cope. Today, an estimated 100,000 people are 
infected by the disease, which translates to 2% of the PNG population47, a 
number 20 times of that in Australia (AusAID, 2006, p. 54, online; Cullen, 2006, 
p. 153; "Sick No Good", 2006). 
There are several reasons why HIV/AIDS in PNG has reached these proportions 
and continues to spread at an alarming rate, with some of the most important 
being widespread gang culture, violence against women, a lack of government 
services such as healthcare, infrastructure and education, as well as a common 
trust in herbal remedies and sorcery (AusAID, 2006, p. 53, online; "Sick No 
Good", 2006). All theses reasons have their roots in cultural traditions and 
poverty. 
According to a recent Four Corners documentary ("Sick No Good", 2006), Port 
Moresby is "the ideal setting for the spread of AIDS" due to its high levels of 
violence, unsafe sex and prostitution. The gang-culture is one large contributor to 
the spread ofHIV/AIDS in the capital (as well as in other large cities), as it is a 
status sign in these raskol gangs to have many sexual partners. Rape is often 
47 Dr Yves Renault, a WHO representative in PNG has estimated that one million Papua New 
Guineans could be infected by 2015 and that the country is likely to experience an epidemic like 
that seen in Africa (Renault, cited in Cullen, 2006, p. 153). 
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carried out as a part of other crimes, such as break-ins and robbery48 and, 
according to local gang members in the Port Moresby suburb of Gerehu, members 
rape girls to show off ("Sick No Good", 2006). 
The lack of education on HIV I AIDS further contributes to the problem as many 
do not believe that condoms are essential in protecting themselves against the 
disease (AusAID, 2006, pp. 72-74). The manager of a Port Moresby brothel, 
pointed out by the police as one ofthe city's "AIDS hot spots" ("Sick No Good", 
2006), does not consider the sexual health of the girls working for him as his 
problem, and only occasionally would he tell them to use condoms. According to 
a 2002 survey, 70 % of sex workers would not use a condom as their customers 
would pay more for unprotected sex (Cullen, 2006, p. 156) Also, a recent study of 
sex workers in PNG showed that 17 % are HIV positive, however the manager 
interviewed in "Sick No Good" (2006) did not display any concern as he had 
heard there existed a herbal cure for AIDS. 
The lack of education on HIV/AIDS is als0 evident in the rural areas ofPNG, 
with the chair of the PNG parliamentary committee on HIV/AIDS, Dr Banare 
Bun, stating that 85 %of the rural population still lacked knowledge of the 
disease (Cullen, 2006, p. 155). Furthermore, as the country suffers from extremely 
poor infrastructure, the current efforts of organisations such as the UN AIDS do 
not reach the more remote areas of the country (Cullen, 2006, p. 155). 
48 Rape has traditionally been a part of tribal fighting and warfare. See Strathem (1979, pp. 49-50). 
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As people are poorly educated, traditional taboos on talking about sex, and fears 
and stigma connected with HIV/AIDS are still very strong (AusAID, 2006, p. 79, 
online; "Sick No Good", 2006). This means that many people are afraid of getting 
tested and live with the disease without knowing. It also prevents people from 
receiving proper care as there have been cases of local doctors refusing to treat 
HIV I AIDS infected patients, as well as of families disowning infected family 
members (AusAID, 2006, p. 64, online; "Sick No Good", 2006). 
Even if infected people do get admitted to hospitals, there are insufficient 
resources to treat the patients. According to Cullen (2006, p. 160), AIDS is the 
leading cause of death at the Port Moresby General Hospital and Sister Elizabeth 
Waken, who is in charge of the unofficial AIDS ward at the hospital, says that 
they often run out of basic medicines and supplies. The hospital cannot find 
enough staff to work in the ward and there is not enough money to ensure that the 
patients are fed ("Sick No Good", 2006). 
Although the PNG government has started· to take action against the spread of 
HIV/AIDS in the country, the current infection and its growth rates together with 
the deeply rooted traditions of sexual practices and attitudes of the population 
makes for extreme problems in the near future as shown by the AusAID report 
Impacts ofHIVIAIDS 2005-2025 in Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and East 
Timo/9 (2006, online). One workforce sector that is hard-hit is education where 
PNG is already losing at least one teacher each week to HIV/AIDS related causes 
(Morris & Stewart, 2005, online). According to the Department ofForeign Affairs 
49 This report is mainly concerned with predicted scenarios for the next two decades and only 
provides limited information on the current situation. 
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and Trade (2004, p. 9), a study done in 2002 showed that a worse-case scenario 
would see the total number of deaths from HIV/AIDS each year reach 120,000 by 
2020. IfPNG continues its current response to HIV/AIDS, over 300,000 adults 
will die as a result ofHIV/AIDS related illness over the next 20 years (AusAID, 
2006, p. 79). This could mean that a third of the PNG workforce would be wiped 
out resulting in dire social and economic consequences. 
It is therefore clear that the HN/AIDS epidemic is not only a social problem but it 
has the obvious potential to create huge economic problems and it needs a firm 
political response. Again the Index has failed to provide an indicator for an 
extremely important issue, and the need for links between political, economic and 
social indicators has been further highlighted. 
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Conclusion 
The key aim of this thesis has been to examine how failed state theory is 
represented in the PSI and to what extent the Index accurately captures the 
challenges facing Papua New Guinea. The significance ofthis aim is highlighted 
by the academic discourse on failed, failing and weak states which has attracted 
increased attention since the September 11 attacks. This served as an eye-opener 
for the western world; global security could be severely threatened and attacked 
by elements originating in failing states. Some have referred to this discourse as a 
'theory' as has this thesis, however, most experts treat failed state theory as a 
broad concept and suggest it needs further research. 
Failed state theory has the potential to become an important political tool, 
however there has yet to emerge a universal agreement on the definition of state 
failure. To be applicable, the definitions used in the 'theory' needs to be specific 
enough to discuss details contributing to state failure, yet broad enough to apply to 
different countries experiencing varying problems. It follows that an attempt to 
incorporate failed state theory into an analytical tool will face problems in how it 
uses definitive categories to assess countries. 
A recent attempt to incorporate the ideas from failed state theory in order to use it 
as a tool for analysis of states has been the PSI. It incorporates the CAST 
methodology of 12 indicators which are designed to identify signs of state failure. 
By giving each of these indicators a rating between 0 and10, a country can be 
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given a number which places it on a continuum ranging from collapsed to weak 
states. 
The FSI is a welcome contribution to the furthering of a global understanding of 
the phenomenon of state failure. By placing its indicators into political, economic 
and social categories, it provides a broad assessment of how a country is 
performing in each of these areas. Potentially it has the capacity to break down the 
overall performance of a country and pin-point particular areas where the main 
problems lie. It follows that it could be an important assessment tool that can help 
improving the stability of a state, as well as predict and, hopefully, prevent future 
problems. 
The case study presented in this thesis serves as a test for how useful the FSI is in 
analysing the situation in one particular country; in this case Papua New Guinea. 
By examining how the Index's indicators apply to PNG, and comparing this to 
primary and secondary sources providing information about the current situation 
in the country, a number of conclusions can be drawn. 
First, the Index does not posses a sufficient number of indicators to fully assess 
the political, economic and social situation within a given country. This is shown 
by the lack of indicators for such important issues as HIV/AIDS and crime and 
violence. HIV/AIDS has been classified as an epidemic in PNG; it is spreading 
rapidly and the health system is already unable to cope. Furthermore, HIV I AIDS 
has reached extreme levels in many African countries where it is associated with 
state failure. It therefore seems that it should be included as an indicator. Crime 
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and violence is also a widespread problem in PNG and its severity, both in the 
cities and in rural areas, necessitates the need for an indicator dealing with it · 
directly. 
Crime and violence is, however, partly accounted for in some ofthe indicators, 
which leads to the second conclusion: some indicators are too narrowly defined. 
The indicators for public services and group grievances both partly accommodate 
for problems related to crime and violence but the limitations of these indicators, 
as specified by their definitions, mean that the indicators are insufficient in taking 
into account the full extent of the crime and violence problem. For example, 
group grievances seems to account for the problems caused by inter-tribal warfare 
in the highlands, but not the problems caused by raskol gangs in the cities. 
Furthermore, PNG's economic dependence on foreign aid should clearly be 
included in the economic indicators, however they are too narrowly defined to 
specifically deal with it. Australia's influence in PNG is still relatively strong, 
mainly because it provides such a significant amount of aid each year, and the 
ability of the PNG state to function fully independently of Australia is 
questionable. This problem is accounted for by the Index in the political indicator 
of external influence, but it is also an economic problem. Therefore, the third 
conclusion is that the Index needs better linking between different indicators. 
The Index fails to link indicators together when analysing a problem, such as 
economic problems caused by the dependence on aid and the demographic 
pressure, which is included in the social indicators. For the Index to be able to 
accurately assess the situation in a country, it needs to rely on cross-category 
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analyses of the problems, rather than on a rating that is made up from the issues 
being treated separately as is the case today. This is obvious when considering the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic that is currently facing PNG. To fully analyse and 
understand the impacts of the epidemic, both social, political and economic issues 
must be considered. Furthermore, several of the issues covered by the Index's 
indicators have the capacity to affect each other. They are all related to the 
political indicator of state legitimacy as this determines the ability of the state to 
deal with the problems facing it. Therefore, an attempt to provide a country 
assessment based on separately treated issues, such as the indicators of the FSI, 
will always have problems with painting the full picture. 
Fourth, the use of a research window presents problems with consistency and the 
inability to analyse events further in the past. This is exemplified by the 
Bougainville conflict which, although the violence stopped nearly a decade ago, 
I 
still affects PNG's stability through political and economic problems. Also, as the 
Bougainville Province will be allowed to hold a referendum on the question of its 
proposed independence, Bougainville has the capacity to significantly influence 
PNG's stability in the future. Furthermore, the estimated problems ofHIV/AIDS 
that will face the country over the next couple of decades stress the importance of 
considering issues outside of the limited time frame of the research window as 
they are so severe that the Index should clearly accommodate for them in its 
assessment ofPNG. 
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Furthermore, an assessment of a country based on the ideas of failed state theory 
win· always rely heavily upon the existence of reliable and adequate data. In its 
data collection, the FSI relies on software that scans 'tens of thousands' open-
source reports and articles. This method is designed to register a country's number 
of positive and negative hits related to each ofthe indicators, however, it does not 
seem to allow for lack of consistent or reliable data. As has been shown in this 
thesis, there appears to be a range of conflicting unemployment figures in PNG, as 
well as a lack of reliable crime data. The indicator for human flight rated high due 
to PNG's problem of people leaving to seek better opportunities abroad. 
According to the Index, this is a severe problem, scoring 8.0 out of 10, and it 
constitutes a twelfth ofPNG's overall assessment even though it is not generally 
recognised as a severe problem in the literature on PNG. This questions the 
Index's use of data. Also, as shown in tables 3 and 4, the data for basic social 
indicators vary from one report to another. Therefore it can be concluded that the 
problem posed by the lack of reliable and consistent data will inevitably affect any 
attempt to analyse PNG, and the FSI' s assessment is no exception. 
Having analysed key political, economic and social issues in PNG, it is clear that 
there are problems that the Index has not adequately dealt with. This would 
suggest that the rating of PNG as a weak state may be somewhat optimistic and 
that it is perhaps closer to being a failing state50• However, this raises the question 
of what exactly constitutes a weak, a failing, or a failed state. As different states 
face ,Problems to different extents, or different problems altogether, one 'weak' or 
'failing' state may be functioning in a considerably different way to a second 
50 As already argued by a number of experts, see Denoon (2005). 
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'weak' or 'failing' state. One state may be severely 'failing' in some areas but still 
function well in others. Would this mean that it is 'failing' more or less than a 
state that faces a wider range of less severe problems? 
The Index has, however, identified some key problems in PNG, and it makes a 
valuable contribution to the understanding of the current situation in the country. 
It can therefore be concluded that the Index has a limited usefulness which can be 
improved if some or all of the shortcomings, as discussed in this thesis, are 
addressed. However, as failed state theory is still evolving, both the Index and the 
'theory' need to be further researched to find a balance between making 
assessments based on specific indicators and being applicable as a broad concept. 
It is currently unclear whether this is achievable, but the significance of the 
problem of state failure and the potential of failed state theory to improve the 
global security and humanitarian situation justifies future attempts. 
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Appendix A- The FS/2006, Number 1 to 6051• 
Rank Country Total Score 
1 Sudan 112.3 
2 Dem. Rep. ofthe Congo 110.1 
3 Ivory Coast 109.2 
4 Iraq 109.0 
5 Zimbabwe 108.9 
6 Chad 105.9 
6 Somalia 105.9 
8 Haiti 104.6 
9 Pakistan 103.1 
10 Afghanistan 99.8 
11 Guinea 99 
11 Liberia 99 
13 Central African Republic 97.5 
14 North Korea 97.3 
15 Burundi 96.7 
16 Yemen 96.6 
16 Sierra. Leone 96.6 
18 Burma 96.5 
19 Bangladesh 96.3 
20 Nepal 95.4 
21 Uganda 94.5 
22 Nigeria 94.4 
22 Uzbekistan 94.4 
24 Rwanda 92.9 
25 Sri Lanka 92.4 
26 Ethiopia 91.9 
27 Colombia 91.8 
28 Kyrgyzstan 90.3 
29 Malawi 89.8 
51 For the full Index, see Failed States Index (2006c, online). 
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30 Burkina Faso 89.7 
31 Egypt 89.5 
32 Indonesia 89.2 
33 Syria 88.6 
33 Kenya 88.6 
35 Bosnia and Herzegovina 88.5 
36 Cameroon 88.4 
37 Angola 88.3 
37 Togo 88.3 
39 Bhutan 87.9 
39 Laos 87.9 
41 Mauritania 87.8 
42 Tajikistan 87.7 
43 Russia 87.1 
44 Niger 87 
45 Turkmenistan 86.1 
46 Guinea-Bissau 85.4 
47 Cambodia 85 
47 Dominic Republic 85 
49 Papua New Guinea 84.6 
50 Belarus 84.5 
51 Guatemala 84.3 
52 Equatorial Guinea 84 
52 Iran 84 
54 Eritrea 83.9 
55 Serbia and Montenegro 83.8 
56 Bolivia 82.9 
57 China 82.5 
57 Moldova 82.5 
59 Nicaragua 82.4 
(>0 Georgia 82.2 
Source: Failed States Index, (2006c, online). 
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Appendix B - The Indicators of the FSI 
Social indicators: 
Mounting demographic pressure- Pressures deriving from high population 
density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources; Pressures 
deriving from group settlement patterns that affect the freedom to participate in 
common forms of human and physical activity, including economic productivity, 
travel, social interaction, religious worship; Pressures deriving from group 
settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or 
occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or 
historical sites, and proximity to environmental hazards; Pressures from skewed 
population distributions, such as a "youth or age bulge," or from divergent rates of 
population growth among competing communal groups; 
Massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons creating complex 
humanitarian emergencies- Forced uprooting oflarge communities as a result of 
random or targeted violence and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease, 
lack of clean water, land competition, and turmoil that can spiral into larger 
humanitarian and security problems, both within and between countries. 
A legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia -History of 
aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, which could date 
back centuries; Patterns of atrocities committed with impunity against communal 
groups; Specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, 
for persecution .or repression; Institutionalized political exclusion; Public 
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scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as 
evidenced in the emergence of "hate" radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or 
nationalistic political rhetoric. 
Chronic and sustained human flight- "Brain drain" of professionals, intellectuals 
and political dissidents fearing persecution or repression; Voluntary emigration of 
"the middle class," particularly economically productive segments of the 
population, such as entrepreneurs, business people, artisans and traders, due to 
economic deterioration; Growth of exile communities. 
Economic indicators: 
Uneven economic development along group lines - Group-based inequality, or 
perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and economic status; Group-based 
impoverishment as measured by poverty levels, infant mortality rates, education 
levels; Rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group 
inequalities. 
Sharp and I or severe economic decline- A pattern of progressive economic 
decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, GNP, debt, 
child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures, and other economic 
measures; Sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue, foreign investment or 
debt payments; Collapse or devaluation of the national currency; Extreme social 
hard!)hip imposed by economic austerity programs; Growth of hidden economies, 
including the drug trade, smuggling, and capital flight; Increase in levels of 
corruption and illicit transactions among the general populace; Failure of the state 
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to pay salaries of government employees and armed forces or to meet other 
financial obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments. 
The political indicators: 
Criminalisation and I or delegitimisation of the state -Massive and endemic 
corruption or profiteering by mling elites; Resistance of mling elites to 
transparency, accountability and political representation; Widespread loss of 
popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., widely boycotted or 
contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, 
inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of 
armed insurgencies; Growth of crime syndicates linked to mling elites. 
Progressive deterioration of public services - Disappearance of basic state 
functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism 
and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, 
sanitation, public transportation; State apparatus narrows to those agencies that 
serve the mling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, 
diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies. 
The suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread 
violation of human rights; - Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military 
mle in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are 
susp.ended or manipulated; Outbreak of politically inspired (as opposed to 
criminal) violence against innocent civilians; Rising number of political prisoners 
or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and 
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practices; Widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of 
individuals, groups or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, 
politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public 
repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution). 
Security apparatus operates as a "state within a state" - Emergence of elite or 
praetorian guards that operate with impunity; Emergence of state-sponsored or 
state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected 
"enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition; Emergence of an 
"army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military or 
political clique; Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces or private armies in an 
armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces. 
The rise of factionalised elites -Fragmentation of ruling elites and state 
institutions along group lines; Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling 
elites, often in terms of communal irredentism, (e.g., a "greater Serbia") or of 
communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith"). 
Intervention of other states or external political actors -Military or Para-military 
engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, 
identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of 
the conflict; Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-
dep~ndence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions. 
Source: Failed States Index, (2006h, online). 
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Appendix C- The CAST system 
Methodology Behind CAST 
The CAST methodology presents a framework for early warning and assessment 
of societies at risk of internal conflict and state collapse. The model can be used to 
enable the international community to take preventive action to stem conflict, 
prepare for peacekeeping and stability missions, assess conditions for sustainable 
security and provide metrics or measures of effectiveness for post-conflict 
reconstruction. For an example of how the methodology has been used, please see 
our Iraq reports. 
The steps of the methodology are the following: 
1. Pre-Assessment Steps 
To prepare for Conflict Assessment: 
• Collect relevant conflict data 
• Develop a complete chronology of events 
• Choose key dates for Trend Point assessment 
2. Rating The Twelve Indicators 
' 
The "What's Going On?" Step 
Social Indicators 
1. Mounting Demographic Pressures 
2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating 
Complex Humanitarian Emergencies 
3. Legacy ofVengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia 
4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight 
Economic Indicators 
5. Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines 
6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline 
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Political Indicators 
7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization ofthe State 
8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services 
9. Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread 
Violation of Human Rights 
10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State" 
11. Rise ofFactionalized Elites 
12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors 
Indicators measure the key social, economic, political and military conditions 
within a state at a given date. 
Basic Steps: 
• Rate each indicator on scale of 0 (low intensity) to 10 (high intensity) 
• Total ratings to get trend points 
• Build aggregate and individual indicator trend lines 
3. Assessing The Core, Five 
The "What Have We Got to Work With?" Step 
Core Five assessment helps determine the capacity of core institutions to manage 
the situation at hand or a state's "capacity to cope". 
For sustainable security, a state should have the following Core Five: 
• A competent domestic police force and corrections system 
• An efficient and functioning civil service or professional bureaucracy 
• An independent judicial system that works under the rule of law 
• A professional and disciplined military accountable to a legitimate civilian 
government 
• A strong executive/legislative leadership capable of national governance 
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4. Identifying STINGS 
The "What Else is Relevant?" Step 
STINGS are the unanticipated factors that act as catalysts to accelerate or 
decelerate the immediate risk of conflict 
STINGS is an acronym used here to describe: 
• Surprises (e.g., currency collapse) 
• Triggers (e.g., assassinations, coup d'etats) 
• Idiosyncrasies (e.g., non-contiguous territory, a deference to authority) 
• National Temperaments (e.g., cultural or religious perspectives) 
• Spoilers (e.g., disgruntled followers, excluded parties) 
5. Building a Conflict Map 
The "What's the Big Picture?" Step 
Plotting the course of the conflict for each significant date allows one to visually 
depict the potential for the conflict to turn violent or to be resolved. 
Source: Failed States Index, (2006e, online). 
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Appendix D - Prime Ministers in PNG since independence 
September 1975- March 1980 Michael Somare 
March 1980- August 1982 Julius Chan 
August 1982- November 1985 Michael Somare 
November 1985- July 1988 Paias Wingti 
July 1988- July 1992 Rabbie Namaliu 
July 1992 -August 1994 Paias Wingti 
September 1994- March 1997 Julius Chan 
March 1997 - July 1997 John Gihenu 
July 1997- July 1999 Bill Skate 
July 1999 -August 2002 Mekere Morauta 
August 2002 -Present Michael Somare 
Sources: Turner, (2001, p. 291); The World Fact Book, (2006, online). 
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Appendix E - Selected Election Statistics in PNG 
Sitting Members of Parliament returned 1992 - 2002 
1992 1997 2002 
Members returned 44 55 
(%) (40) (50.5) (25) 
Sources: Dorney, (1997, online); 
Griffin, (1997, p. 76); May, (2006, p. 164). 
Number of Candidates 1977- 1997 
Number of 
Candidates 
1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 
879 1125 ' 1513 1655 2372 
Average per 8.1 10.3 13.9 15.2 21.7 
electorate 
Sources: May, (2004, p. 4); Reilly, (2002a, p. 248). 
Number of winning candidates receiving 
less than 20% of votes 1977-1997 
1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 
Number of 11 24 41 54 62 
Candidates 
Source: Reilly, (2002a, p. 248). 
Number ofwinning candidates receiving 
less than 10% ofvotes 1977-1997 
1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 
Number of 4 2 9 15 
Candidates 
Source: Reilly, (2002a, p. 248). 
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